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1  Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to compare the effects of vertical separation and integration
in a utility industry where entrants in an imperfectly competitive sector invest to reduce
cost disadvantages.
In utility industries, such as telecommunications, electricity generation, gas supply,
and train services, no service can be supplied without access to an essential network
facility. Some examples of essential network facilities include the networks for electricity
and gas transmissions and railway tracks. In utility industries, only the essential network
facilities have the characteristics of natural monopoly. Thus, progress in reforms for utility
industries has been observed since the 1980s in developed countries. The points of reforms
are as follows. First, potentially competitive sectors are liberalized and hence, new entry
is promoted. Second, natural monopolistic sectors are separated from competitive ones.
In other words, no firm has a monopoly over the supply of an essential network service
while acting m a competitive sector. Third, the access price for using an essential facility
is regulated.
The structural change from vertical integration to vertical separation in a utility in
dustry does not necessarily expand economic welfare. The advantage of this structural
change in economic welfare is the promotion of fair competition becaiase all firms can use
an essential network facility under the same cost condition. On the other hand, the disad
vantages include the duplication of the fixed cost with a new entry and, if the production
of incumbents is relatively efficient, the shift of production allocation from incumbents
to entrants. Therefore, the regulator must set an access price level that takes account of
this trade-off. This paper attempts to answer the following questions to help regulators
with their decision-making process. What is the optimal access price level under vertical
separation and integration? When does vertical separation have a welfare advantage over
vertical integration?
To answer these questions, we analyze using the following model. Consider a compet
itive sector in which the incumbent has a cost advantage for production and n entrants
invest in cost reduction.^ The cost condition for entrants, however, is inferior to that
for the incumbent after investment; that is, the entrants invest to reduce the cost differ
ence with the incumbent. The incumbent and entrants produce a homogeneous good and
supply it using an essential facility. The access price for using the essential facility is reg
ulated. The essential facility is possessed by the incumbent or third-party operator other
^For instance, in the generation sector of Japan's electric power industry, renewable energy entrants
have undertaken cost-reducing investments through the recent reforms in electricity systems and energy
mix in power generation. Thus, this assumption is not unrealistic.
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than the incumbent and entrants. When the incumbent {resp. third-party operator) has
a monopoly over the network operation, the competitive and natural monopolistic sectors
in the industry are vertically integrated {resp. separated). The regulator and firms behave
in three stages. In the first stage, the regulator sets an access price level. In the second,
the entrants strategically precommit to the cost-reducing investment level. Finally, the
incumbent and entrants choose their output levels in the Coumot fashion. To compensate
the deficits or eliminate profits resulting from the regulation of access price, the regulator
gives a lump-sum subsidy to the incumbent or third-party operator.
The maiu results of this paper are as follows. When the number of entrants is small,
the optimal access price level is lower than the marginal cost of the network service,
irrespective of the vertical structure of the industry. When the number of entrants is
large, however, this level is higher than the marginal cost if the cost-reducing eflFect of
investments is not small. Moreover, for a small number of entrants, vertical separation
holds a welfare advantage, while for a large number of entrants, vertical integration holds
if the cost-reducing effect of investments is not small and the optimal access price level is
not sufficiently higher than the marginal cost.
The literature contains many studies on access price regulation.^ The marginal cost
pricing is theoretically optimal from the economic welfare viewpoint. Laffont and Tirole
(1994), however, showed that an access price that has deviated fi'om the marginal cost
pricing is optimal when there is asymmetric information between the regulator and firms
and when a lump-sum subsidy is impossible.
Armstrong et al. (1994) and Vickers (1995) compared the welfare effects of vertical
separation and integration using a Coumot oligopoly model. In their models, firms pro
duce a homogeneous good at the same cost and a lump-sum subsidy is available. Their
main results are as follows. For a demand function such that access price regulation affects
the number of firms in a competitive sector, it is optimal to set a higher access price than
the marginal cost to avoid the duplication of the fixed cost for entry. Thus, economic
welfare is larger under vertical integration where the incumbent can use an essential fa-
cUity at the marginal cost. For a demand function such that access price regulation does
not affect the number of firms, however, it is optimal to set a lower access price than the
^For the efficient component pricing rule, see Willig (1979), Baumol (1983), Baumol and Sidak (1994a,
1994b), Kahn and Taylor (1994), Tye (1994), and Sidak and Spulber (1997). Economides and White
(1994, 1995) and Hausman (1997), for instance, discuss the total element long-run incremental cost. For
the relationship between access price and the incentive for the construction of an essential facility, see
Gans and Williams (1999), Cans (2001), Valletti (2003), and de Rus and Socorro (2014). Schmalensee
(1989), Clemenz (1991), Kidokoro (2002), and Ishii (2015a, 2015b) compare cost-based and price-cap
regulation. Ishii (2015c) examines the effects of vertical separation in an industry where entrants in a
competitive sector invest to reduce cost disadvantages.
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marginal cost to reduce the mark-up ratio of the competitive sector. As a result, economic
welfare is larger imder vertical separation where the incumbent and entrants can use the
essential facility at an access price lower than the marginal cost.
Unlike in Armstrong et al. (1994) and Vickers (1995), in this paper, entrants make
cost-reducing investments to reduce cost disadvantages. While in previous studies the
aggravation of the inefficiency arising from a reduction in access price is caused by the
duplication of the fixed cost for entry, in this paper, it occurs as result of a shift in pro
duction allocation from the relatively efficient incumbent to the entrants by an increased
investment of each entrant. In this paper, the optimal access price level is not necessar
ily lower than the marginal cost, even though access price regulation does not affect the
number of entrants and a lump-sum subsidy is possible. Moreover, the welfare compari
son between vertical separation and integration depends on the number of entrants, the
degree of the cost-reducing effect of investment, and the optimal access price level. These
results are in contrast with those of the previous studies.
For instance, Kurakawa (2013) analyzed the choice of vertical structure in the electric
ity industry, where the incumbent has a cost advantage over entrants in the competitive
sector. He showed that vertical separation is superior in welfare to vertical integration
if and only if the number of entrants is smaller than a certain threshold. As stated
above, this paper demonstrates that the welfare comparison between vertical separation
and integration depends on not only the number of entrants but also the degree of the
cost-reducing effect of investment and the optimal access price level when the entrants
make a cost-reducing investment, even though the incumbent has a cost advantage.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 2
and characterize the equilibrium of the model in section 3. In section 4, the optimal access
price levels and economic welfare under vertical separation and integration are compared.
Concluding remarks are provided in section 5.
2 Model
Consider an industry where the incumbent competes with n identical entrants. The
incumbent and entrants produce a homogeneous product. To supply one unit of the
product, one access to an essential network facility, which has the characteristics of natural
monopoly, is required. We consider two cases in which the essential facility is possessed
by the incumbent or third-party operator other than the incumbent and entrants. When
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the incinnbent {resp, third-party operator) has a monopoly over the network operation,
the competitive and natural monopolistic sectors in the industry are vertically integrated
{resp. separated). The entrants {vesp. incumbent and entrants) are allowed to access the
network at a price of a per unit of access. The access price is regulated.
The incumbent incurs the production cost, to produce x units of the product,
while entrant i (z = 1,2, • • • , ri) bears the production cost, c (ki) when it undertakes ki
units of cost-reducing investment and produces yi units of the product. We assume that
c {ki) > Cm holds for any ki > 0. That is, the entrants produce less efficiently than the
incumbent even though they imdertake a cost-reducing investment.
Assumption 1 The cost function^ c{k)j has the following properties: (z) cf (ki) < 0,
hmfc._o (ki) = —ooj and hm/..^+oo d (fe) = 0, (zz) d' (ki) > 0, and (Hi) d" {ki) < 0.
The market demand is represented by an inverse demand function, P = A — m.
which A > 0 and Q = Vi- The total output level, Q, is assumed to be verifiable.^
The total cost of the network service is C = 0(5 + F, where 6 and F are respectively the
levels of the marginal and the fixed costs when the total output level is Q. We assume that
the regulator can observe the levels of 9 and Fd To compensate the deficits or eliminate
the profit resulting from the regulation of access price, the regulator is assumed to give a
lump-sum subsidy, G, to the incumbent or third-party operator.
The profit functions of the incumbent, entrant z (z = 1,2, • • • , rz), and third-pairty
operator are written as, respectively,
II = {P {Q) - Cm - o} X A p{a - 6) Q pG, (1)
Ei = {P {Q) - c {ki) -ajpi-ki, (2)
M = {l-p){{a-9)Q-F + G}, (3)
where p = 0 and p = 1 represent the cases of vertical separation and integration, respec
tively.
Economic welfare is defined as the sum of economic surplus obtained by all partici
pants; that is,
W = CS-hn-hEEi + M-G, (4)
^This assumption is not unrealistic; for eKample, Japanese electric power companies must notify the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of their electric supply plans over the next decade.
"^This presupposes that the regulator can observe the levels of marginal and fixed costs from historical
data on the cost of network onerations and information on its current technoloev.
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where CS denotes consumers' surplus, which is defined as
rQ
CS= / P{v)dv-P{Q)Q. (5)
Jo
We analyze a three-stage game. In the first stage, the regulator chooses an access price
level, a, to maximize economic welfare in full anticipation of the equilibria of the second
and third stages. In the second, each entrant chooses its investment level, fc, to maxiinize
its profit, taking as given the level of a. In the third, the incumbent and n entrants choose
their output levels in the Coumot fashion. Note that throughout the analysis, the policy
variables do not change during the competition among the firms in the second and third
stages.
3 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium in this model. We use subgame perfection
as the equilibrium concept and solve this game using backward induction.
3.1 Equilibrium output
In the third stage, the incumbent chooses its output level, x, to maximize its profit, taking
as given the levels of access price and investments, a and k= {ki^k2r " ? kn), chosen in
the first and second stages. Entrant z (z = 1,2, • • • ,n) also chooses its output level, z/i, to
maximize its profit, taking as given the values of a and k= (fci, A;2, • • • , kn)- Making vise
of (1) and (2), the first-order conditions for the profit maximization of the incumbent and
entrant i are respectively
P{Q)-Cm-a + P'{Q)x + ,i{a-e)^ = 0, (6)
P{Q)-c{ki)-a + P'{Q)yi = 0. (7)
The equilibrium output levels of the incumbent and entrant i (z = 1,2, • • • , zz) for any
relevant a, k= (fci, ^ 2, • • • , A;„), rz, and ji are
X* (a, fe, 7Z, /z) = — < A - (?z H- 1) c,n + ^  c (ki) - a + /z (rz + 1) (a - 0) > ,
^ + i=i J
(8)
Vi {a, k,7i,fx) = lA + Crn-{n+l)c{ki) + '^c{kj)-a-fj.{a-e)[.
I  )
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(9)
To guarantee that x* (a, fe, ri, fj) > 0 and y* (a, fe, n, /u) > 0, the following assumption is
made.
Assumption 2 y* (a, 0, n, > 0 holds for any relevant a, n, and /i.
3.2 Equilibrium investment
In the second stage, given the level of a set in the first stage, entrant i (z = 1,2, • • • ,72)
chooses its investment level, /cj, to maximize its profit. Let = /c* (a, n, /x) be the
equilibrium investment level of entrant i for any a, = {kj (a, 7i, ^5 and /x. is
defined as
A;* = argmax {P {Q (a, Aj^, fe_i, 7i, /x)) - c (fci) - a) yi (a, Aij, k-i, n, n) - /c^.
In this analysis, we consider a symmetric equilibrium. Let k = k{a^ 71, /x) and y* (a, /c, ri, /x)
be the investment and output levels of each entrant for any a, rx, and /x when assuming
symmetry. The first-order condition for the profit maximization problem for each entrant
is
(a, k, n, jj) = {a, k, n, n) c' (k) = 1. (10)
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The left-hand side (LHS) of (10) represents the marginal revenue from an additional
increase in investment at ki = A:, while the right-hand side (RHS) expresses the marginal
cost. When the symmetric investment level. A:, satisfies that —y* (a. A:, ri, jj) d (A:) = 1, the
production cost is minimized. Prom (10), however, it is obvious that —y* (a. A:, rx, /x) d (A:) <
1 holds. This implies that the strategic interaction in the output stage distorts each en
trant's behavior from cost minimization. Letting fc* = A:* (a, rx, /x) be the investment level
of each entrant in the symmetric second-stage equilibrium, it satisfies (10). It follows
from (10) that the existence of A;* (a, rx, /x) is guaranteed imder assumptions 1 and 2. The
second-order condition for the optimal investment level when assiiming symmetry is
d{k)
Thus, to guarantee the uniqueness of k* (a, rx, /x), the following assumption is made.
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Assumption 3 e{k) = d' (k) /d {kf < —2 (n + 1)^ / (?^ + 2)^ holds for any k, n, and (i.
Moreover, we assume the following adjustment process to the symmetric equilibrium
investment:
= a [$* (a, fc, 71, /i) — (a, fc*, ri, //)],
where o: is any positive value. Then, the stability condition of the equilibrium solution is
d^*{a,k,n,fj) ,,,^2f4(n+l) , c"(fc)
Tk +
i|<0. (12)
This holds under assumption 3.
When assuming symmetry, the profit functions of the incumbent and entrant i {i =
1,2, • • • , n) are rewritten as
n* (a, fc*, 71, fi) = X* (a, F, 71, iff fj, {a — 9) ny* (a, F, 7i, //) + //G, (13)
El{a,k*,n,fx) = y* {a,k*,n, nf. (14)
3.3 Equilibrium access price
The economic welfare realized in the symmetric equilibrium for any a, 7i, and /i is defined
as
(a,F,7i,/x)= f P{v)dv-6Q*-CmX*-n[c{k*)y*-{-k""], (15)
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where F = F (a, 77, ^lz), Q* = Q* (a, F, 77, ^lz), F = F (a, F, 77, /z), and y* = y* (a, F, 77, /z).
In the first stage, the regulator chooses the access price level, a, to maximize economic
welfare in full anticipation of the symmetric equilibria of the second and third stages. Let
a* = a* (r7, /z) be the optimal access price level in the symmetric equilibrium, a* (77, /z)
satisfies that
dW* (a, F, 77, fi)
da
where
=w:+w*,k:=o, (16)
w: — y
77 + 2
fi{n+l)}+n{l+fi)
1 V
{n+l){l- yf + 2ny
^T2
77
Wi . + + (a-e). (18)*■ 2(ri+l)Vr ) 2{n+\)y*^ " ^ '
K - -$-^^F^(i + .)<0, (19)n  (.n-2)'t;k
where W* = dW jdr (r = a, fc), fc* = dk^jda^ and = 5$*/9r (r = a, fc). To guarantee
the uniqueness of a* we assume that the second-order condition, dPW* jdd?' < 0,
holds for any n and //.
4 Comparison between separation and integration
In this section, we compare the equilibria between vertical separation and integration.
4.1 Equilibrium investment
First, we compare the equilibriimi investment levels for a fixed access price. Suppose
that a is gun identical access price imposed imder both vertical structures. Differentiating
k* (a, ri, /i) with respect to fi yields
2(n+l)<Hk-)
'  (» + 2)'$I ( 1 '
where k^ = dk*fdji and = d^*/dr (r = /x, k). Hence, k*^ > (=, <) 0 if a < (=, >)
0. Let k^ = k* (a, 7X, 0) and k^ — k* (a, 7i, 1) be the equilibriiun investment levels imder
vertical separation and integration for any a > 0, respectively. Prom (20), we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 1 k^ > (=, <) k^ if a > (=, <) 6,
When the access price is lower than the marginal cost of network operation, vertical
integration induces the entrants to invest more. It imposes on the incumbent the use of
the network at the marginal cost, 0, instead of the access price, a. Therefore, given any
a < 0, it induces the incumbent to produce less in the third-stage equilibrium compared
to vertical separation. The resulting increase in each entrant's output strengthens its
incentive for cost-reducing investment.
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4.2 Optimal access price
Next, we examine whether the optimal access price level differs from the marginal cost
of the network operation and then compare the optimal access price levels under both
vertical structures.
First, we investigate whether the optimal access price level under vertical separation
differs from 0. Let = a* (n, 0) and = W* (a, fc*, n, 0) be the optimal access price
level and equilibrium economic welfare for any a > 0 imder vertical separation.
(16) for a = 0 and /x = 0 is rewritten as
\a=e — , .
da
where
S _ {n + 2f cf{k*) f2{n + l) } fx* n\
=  7^2 1- (23)
^n + ^e{k*)
If > (=, <) 0, then < (=, >) 6 holds under the assumption of (PW*lda? < 0
because dW^/da\a=$ < (=, >) 0. The first term on the RHS of (23) is less than 2 imder
assumption 3, so that < 1 holds. The necessary and sufficient condition for > Q
is e (k*) > -2 (n + 1) / (rx + 2). Thus, when e (k*) < —2 (n -1-1) / (n + 2), > 0 always
holds. Otherwise, it holds if x*/y* — n/Ct^ < 0.
Lemma 1 (z) When e{k*) < —2(rz+ 1) /(72 + 2), < 6 always holds, {ii)Otherwise,
> (=, <) 6 if X* jy* — n/0(A:*,n) > (=, <) 0.
Lemma 1 is the same as proposition 1 in Ishii (2015c). A marginal reduction in access
price at the equilibrium under a = 6 produces two opposite effects on economic welfare.
One is a positive production expansion effect: it reduces the costs of the incumbent and
entrants and consequently, increases their output levels. As a result, it alleviates the
inefficiency from imderproduction owing to imperfect competition. This is expressed in
W(f|a=« = -^<0. (24)
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In particular, note that (24) depends only on the total output level, Q. In other words,
it does not depend on the market shares of the incumbent and entrants.
Next is a negative production allocation effect due to an increased investment. An
additional increase in investment in the equilibrium at a = 9 produces the following effect
on economic welfare:
The part depending on the value of x*/y* in (25) represents the aggravation of the
inefficiency arising from the production ratio of the incumbent to each entrant. Since
c{ki) > Cm for any ki>Ois assumed, it is socially desirable that the incumbent produces
more than each entrant for given other states. However, an increase in investment reduces
the cost of each entrant and hence, induces a shift of production allocation from the
incumbent to the entrants. This shift decreases economic welfare with increasing value
of x*fy*, because a larger value of x*/y* implies that the incxunbent has a larger cost
advantage over each entrant.
The part depending on n—2, on the other hand, expresses the sum of the alleviation of
the inefficiency from imderproduction and aggravation of that caused by overinvestment.
An increase in investment alleviates the inefficiency from imderproduction:
Prom (10), on the other hand, recall that the entrants imdertake overinvestments from
the viewpoint of cost minimization owing to the strategic interaction in the output stage.
Thus, whether an additional investment at the equilibrium under a = 9 improves eco
nomic welfare depends on the degrees of the effects of alleviating the inefficiency from
underproduction and aggravating that from overinvestment. Prom (25), the former {resp.
latter) effect dominates the other if ri = 1 {resp. n > 2). That is, for n > 2, the shift
of production allocation from the incumbent to the entrants by an increased investment
decreases economic welfare with increasing number of entrants. It also follows from (25)
that since x*/y* > 1, this shift of production allocation decreases economic welfare even
If n < 2.
Prom assumption 1, a larger absolute value of e{k) = d' (k) jd (A;)^ at any k > 0 implies
a smaller cost-reducing effect of investment. When£:(A;*) < —2(ri+I)/(?2-}-2), the positive
production expansion effect of a decline in access price on economic welfare dominates
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its negative production allocation effect, because the shift of production allocation from
the incumbent to the entrants is small. Then, a^<e holds irrespective of the number of
entrants. When £{k*) > —2{n + l)/(7i + 2), however, <6 holds if the value of x*/y*^ is
small such that x*/y* < n/Q^ holds.
Now, we investigate the relationship between the value of x*/y* —n/Q^ and the number
of entrants, n, at a = 6. x*/y* at a = 0 is expressed as
^1 ^ 6 Tl {c {k ^  Cm\ (0'7\
^  _ 2c {k*) — e
Differentiating (27) with respect to n gives
A
dn
where
>0. (29)dn\y*°' ^) A + Cm-2c{k')-0
d (x* \ {n + 2){A-Cm-e)c!{k*) ^
-  {A + c„-2c(^)-«r • ' '
^  {■; inydjkr)
n  (n + 2f^l '
where k^ = dk* jdn and /dn. Prom (29)-(31), we obtain that d {x*/y''\a=e) /dn >
0.
Moreover, differentiating n/Q.^ with respect to n jdelds
where
-(—) = -dn J ^{n + 1) (n + 2) ^2n +
X  ~i~ 2)^ € (/^*) ~{~ 2 ^72^ + 572^ + 572 + 2^ j-
+4 (272^ + lOri^ + 7n^ — 4/1 — 4)] , (33)
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/^\ _ 4n {n + 2f {t/ jk*) d" (k*) - Sd' (fc*)^}
Since the sign of the RHS of (33) is negative for any n> I and that of the RHS of (34)
is positive if cf {k*)c^" (k*) — 3c" (fc*)^ < 0, d{n/Q^) /dn < 0 holds if d (/;:*) c"' (fc*) —
3c"(fc*)^ <0.
When d (k) d" {k) — 3c" (fc)^ < 0, e (A;) is decreasing in k. Under assumption 1, we
obtain that Iimfc_o e{k) =0 and lim/t-^+oo ^  (k) = —oo. That e {k) is decreasing in k
is compatible with the limits of e (k) under assumption L Therefore, we assume that
c'(fc)c"'(fc)-3c"(ifc)'<0.
For n = 1, x*/y* — n/Q^\a=e > 0 if
4  4/l-5c, + c(r)-48 8
3  3{2A-c„-<;(J;')-2e} ^ ' 9' ' '
The lower bound of e{k*) in (35) is larger than —4/3 under assumption 2. Hence, (35) sat
isfies the second-order condition for the symmetric equilibrium investment level, e{k*) <
-2 {n + 1)^ / 2)^, and the condition for > 0, e (A:*) > —2 (tz + 1) / (rz + 2).
Sximmarizing the above arguments, the following lemma is made.
Lemma 2 {i)When e{k*) < —2(rz+ 1)/ (rz + 2), < 6 always holds, {ii) Otherwise,
there exists a threshold for the number of entrants, n > I, such that > (=, <) 6 for
n > (=, <) n.
Lemma 2 is the same as proposition 2 in Ishii (2015c). When e {k*) > —2 (?z + 1) / (tz + 2),
an increase in the number of entrants, rz, reduces the production of each entrant and
hence, diminishes its incentive for cost-reducing investment, which relatively worsens the
cost condition of entrants. Thus, the value of x*/y* is increasing in rz. Under the assump
tion that d {k*) c"' (A:*) — 3c" (k*)^ < 0, the value of is decreasing in rz. Thus, there
exists a threshold of the number of entrants, rz, such that > (=, <) 0 for rz > (=, <) rz.
Note that rz is not necessarily greater than one. When £{k*) is in the range of (35),
x*/y* — n/ft^\a=9 > 0 for any rz > 1, so that rz = 1 holds. Thus, the value of x*/y*
depends on not only the number of entrants but also the degree of the cost-reducing effect
of investment. The entrants have a stronger incentive for investment as the number of
entrants becomes smaller. Thus, when the cost-reducing effect of investment is larger such
that (35) holds, a reduction in access price at a = 9 greatly shifts production allocation
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from the incumbent to the entrant even ]£ n = I and consequently, reduces economic
welfare. Then, > 6 holds.
Similarly, we examine whether the optimal access price level under vertical integration
differs from 6. Let = a* (n, 1) and = W* (a, fc*, n, 1) be the optimal access price
level and equilibrium economic welfare for any a > 0 under vertical integration. Then,
(16) (or a = 9 and n = l\s rewritten as
dW\ -2nH'
■U=e=, (36)da " {n + 2f^l'
where
H' = {n+l){y*fc"{k*) (37)
+2- (38)
Under the assumption that (PWfdo? < 0, from (36)-(38), > (=, <) 6 holds if >
(=, <) 0. The denominator of the fraction on the RHS of (38) is less than —2 {n + 1)
imder assumption 3, so that > —2n/ {n + 1) + 2 holds. Note that —2n/ {n + 1) is
decreasing in n and lim,i_^+oo —2n/ (7^ + 1) = —2. Thus, 1 < < 2 holds for n > 1.
This implies that > 0 holds if x^'/y* — > 0.
Lemma 3 > (=, <) 9 if x*Jy* —Q.^> (=, <) 0.
As in the case of vertical separation, a marginal reduction in access price at the
equilibrium under a = 9 generates two opposite effects on economic welfare. It is obvious
from (18) that the negative production allocation effect is the same as the case of vertical
separation. The positive production expansion effect, on the other hand, is caused by the
following reason. Under vertical integration, a decline in access price reduces only the
costs of entrants, which leads to a shift of production allocation from the incumbent to
the entrants. This is expressed in
=  ^y*) <0 if 2/* > y. (39)
This implies that if y* is larger than a half of x*, the shift of production allocation by
a marginal reduction in access price at the equilibrium imder a = 9 improves economic
welfare. Then, < 9 holds.
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Next, we examine the relationship between the values of x* jy* — and n at a = 6.
Differentiating 0^ with respect to n leads to
dQ' do.'
dn ~ dn dk ^ ^
where
dn^ 4(3uH-2) „ , ,
'd^ ~ {n + 2)e{k*)
dCl' -4:n {n + 1) {d {k*) d" jk*) - 3d' {k*f}
dk {n + 2)^ d {k*)'^ £ (k*)
if d {k") d" (k*) - 3d' {k*f < 0.
2  > 0 (42)
It follows from (31), (41), and (42) that dCl^/dn < 0 holds under the assumption that
d (k*) d" {k") - 3d' {k*f < 0.
For n = 1, X*/y* — > 0 if
c(/;*) ^ ^ + ^ ^ /43n
^  ' 9 ^ + 4c,„-5c(A:') 9" ^ ^
Hence, (43) satisfies the second-order condition for the sjunmetric eqmlibriiun investment
level, e (fc*) < —2 (n -I-1)^ / {n-\- 2)^. Making use of d {x*/y*\a=e) /dn > 0 and siunmariz-
ing the above arguments, the following lemma is made.
Lemma 4 There exists a threshold for the number of entrants, ^  > 1, such that >
(=, <) 0 for n > (=, <) n.
The intuition of lemma 4 is the same as that of lemma 2.
Next, we compare the values of n and n. Differentiating dW*Ida with respect to y
leads to
(PW*
^ = + + (44)
where
<n' + 5,' + 3);,-3 - ^
{n + 2f n + 2^ \y* n+lj' ^ '
84
II7» _ n{c{k) Cm {a ^)} / a\
- - 2(„+l)(„ + 2)'(y)' <"-'>■ '*>
_  2(„H-l)c'(f)
(n + 2)' 4J
where W*^ = d^W^fdrdfi (r = a, /c) and = d^k*fdadiji. From (45) and (46), W*^ > 0
and = 0 hold for a = 6. Thus, it follows from (18) and (45)-(47) that {(PW* fdadfi) \a=e
>0, which implies that n <n under the assumption that (PW*fda^ < 0. Prom lemmata
2 and 4 and the fact that n we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When e {k*) < —2 (?i + 1) / (n + 2), (i) < 9 and <6 for I <n<n
and (ii) <0 and > 0 for n > n. Otherwise^ (i) < 6 and <6 for 1 < n <n,
(ii) <{) and > 6 for n<n<n, and (Hi ^  > 0 and of > 9 for n>n.
Proposition 2 indicates that whether and of differ from 9 depends on the degree
of the cost-reducing effect of investment and the number of entrants. Under vertical
separation, a reduction in access price improves the cost conditions of the incumbent
and entrants, while it diminishes each entrant's incentive for cost-reducing investment
owing to the incumbent's expanded production. Thus, its negative production alloca
tion effect on economic welfare shrinks as the cost-reducing effect of investment becomes
smaller. As a result, when the cost-reducing effect of investment is small such that
e (k*) < —2 (ri + I) / {n + 2) holds, its negative production allocation effect on economic
welfare is dominated by its positive production expansion effect if the vertical structure
of the industry is separated. Then, is always lower than 9.
Now, suppose that ^(A:*) > —2{n-\-1) /(n + 2). The threshold of the number of
entrants, n, such that > 9 for n > n \s smaller than that under vertical separation,
n. Recall that xmder vertical integration, a decline in access price worsens only the cost
condition of the efficient incumbent. Then, its negative production allocation effect on
economic welfare is larger under vertical integration. Thus, > 9 is realized at a smaller
number of entrants compared to the case of vertical separation.
Armstrong et al. (1994) and Vickers (1995) showed that < 9 and < 9 when all
firms in a competitive sector produce at the same marginal cost, the number of firms in the
competitive sector is fixed, and a lump-sum subsidy is available. The reason is as follows.
< 9 and < 9 are to avoid the harmful effect arising from underproduction owing
to imperfect competition and encourage market competition. In contrast, this analysis
shows that even if the number of firms in a competitive sector is fixed and a lump-sum
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subsidy is possible, the optimal access price level is higher or lower than irrespective
of the industry's vertical structure. To avoid the inefficiency arising from the production
expansion of relatively inefficient firms, the optimal access price level tends to be higher
than 9 as the number of them and the cost-reducing effect of their investments become
larger.
4.3 Economic welfare
Finally, we compare between economic welfare imder vertical separation and integration.
First, we examine the welfare change from vertical separation to vertical integration imder
a fixed access price. The change in economic welfare is expressed as
(a, k\ n, 1) - W* (a, k\ n, 0) = [' {W^k; + W;) d/x,
Jo
(48)
where
From (18) and (20),
w;:k;>{<) o if a-e>{<) o, (5o)
whereas from (49),
W;>0 if (^-/x)(a-0)|a-0 + i^V3^| >0 (51)
and
[ W;dfi <0 if a - 0 < 0,
Jo
(52)
because
Jo \^+l / 72+1 2
From (50)-(52), we obtain the following result.
Lemma 5 {i)W* {a,k*,n^O) > W* {a,k*,n^l) holds if a < 9. {ii)W*{a^k*,n^O) <
W*{a,k*,n,l) holdsife <a<a, wftere a = 0 y*/ (;^).
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When a < 6^ under vertical integration, the incumbent must use the network at a
higher cost than access price, so that economic welfare is smaller imder vertical integration.
Using lemma 5, we obtain that if < 0, then W* (a^, k*, ?2,0) > W* (a^, /c*, tz, l) holds.
It follows from the definition of the optimal access price level that W* (a*^, O) >
W* (a^, fc*, n, O) when and are lower than 0, because from proposition 2, < 6
holds for < 6. Thus, W* (a*^, O) > W* (a^, A;*,n, l) holds when and are
lower than 9,
When a > 6, on the other hand, under vertical integration, the incumbent can use
the network at the marginal cost, which is lower than the access price. If a is sufficiently
high, however, there exists a larger inefficiency from underproduction. Thus, lemma 5
shows that vertical integration holds a welfare advantage if 0 < a < a, whereas the
welfare comparison between vertical separation and integration is ambiguous if a > a.
Moreover, making use of lemma 5, we obtain that if 6 < <a^ then W* (a*^, A:*, n, l) >
W* (a*^, fc*,n,0) holds. It foUows from the definition of the optimal access price level
that W* (a^, k*, n, l) > W* (a^, A:*, n, l) when and are greater than 0, because from
proposition 2, > 0 holds for > 9. Therefore, W* (a^, A;*,n, l) > W* (a*^,
holds when and are greater than 9 but less than a. Summarizing the above argu
ments, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (z) When and are lower than 9, economic welfare is larger under
vertical separation, (ii) When and are greater than 9 but less than a, economic
welfare is larger under vertical integration.
Now, we explain the intuition of proposition 3. When a the change from ver
tical separation to vertical integration worsens the cost condition of the incumbent and
hence, induces the entrants to expand their outputs. This aggravates the inefficiency from
overinvestment from the viewpoint of cost minimization, whereas it alleviates that from
underproduction. When and are less than 0, because the former aggravation effect
dominates the latter alleviation, vertical separation has a welfare advantage.
When a > 0, on the other hand, this change improves the cost condition of the
incumbent and hence, induces the entrants to invest less, although it aggravates the
inefficiency from underproduction. When and are greater than 9 but less than a,
because the effect of alleviating the inefficiency from overinvestment is dominant, vertical
integration holds a welfare advantage.
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Armstrong et al. (1994) and Vickers (1995) showed that economic welfare is larger
under vertical integration when aU firms in a competitive sector are symmetric, the number
of firms in the competitive sector is fixed, and a lump-sum subsidy is possible. In contrast,
this paper showed that vertical integration does not necessarily hold a welfare advantage
even though the number of firms in a competitive sector is fixed and a lump-sum subsidy
is available. This results from the employed model which takes account of the investment
behavior of entrants distorted from cost minimization owing to the strategic interaction
in the output stage.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper compared the effects of vertical separation and integration in a utility industry
where entrants in an imperfectly competitive sector invest to reduce cost disadvantages.
A reduction in access price improves the inefficiency arising from imderproduction owing
to imperfect competition, while it shifts production allocation from the relatively efficient
incumbent to the entrants by an increased cost-reducing investment. The regulator needs
to decide the level of access price while accounting for this trade-off. The main results of
our analysis is as follows. When the number of entrants is small, the optimal access price
level is lower than the marginal cost of the network service, irrespective of the vertical
structure of the industry. When the number of entrants is large, on the other hand, it
is higher than the marginal cost if the cost-reducing effect of investment is not small.
Moreover, for a small number of entrants, vertical separation holds a welfare advantage,
while for a large number of entrants, vertical integration holds if the cost-reducing effect
of investment is not small and the optimal access price level is not sufficiently higher than
marginal cost.
Since we could not analytically compare vertical separation and integration for the
other states of the number of entrants and optimal access price level, a simulation analysis
using numerical exgtmples is necessary. Our results depends on the presupposition that
the incumbent has a cost advantage. If the entrants are superior to the incumbent in the
cost condition, then the result would be different from ours. Since in reality incumbents
in utility industries often have a cost advantage owing to the economies of scale, however,
our presupposition is not necessarily unrealistic.
In the situation assumed in the model, when the number of entrants is small, the
change in industrial structure from vertical integration to separation woiold be a welfare-
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enhancing regulatory reform. When the number of entrants is large, however, the vertical
structure change does not necessarily increase economic welfare. Our result suggests that
in the latter case, it would be socially beneficial to implement the entry requirement for
productivity to encourage the entry of more efficient firms.
Since the comparison between vertical separation and integration was shown to depend
on demand function in previous studies, it is necessary to conduct an analysis using non
linear demand functions. In addition, the analysis with free entry and exit should be
performed to clarify the long-rxm influence of the change in the vertical structure of
utility industries. These analyses are left for future study.
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